A indústria do anti fake news, por Luis Nassif

Sorria: você está sendo espionado!
A milícia se apresenta

[video:https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=KXAhkWfYaWY%5D
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=KXAhkWfYaWY

Do site do senado brasileiro:

“Five Eyes: espionagem moderna começou há quase um século
A modernização do negócio da espionagem tem um marco inicial definido: a assinatura, em março de 1946, do Tratado de Segurança entre os Estados Unidos e o Reino Unido. O acordo formalizou a Carta do Atlântico, assinada em 1941, antes da entrada americana na 2ª Guerra Mundial, para a decodificação de mensagens alemãs e japonesas e a partilha de informações secretas entre os Estados Unidos e o Reino Unido. Restrito inicialmente aos dois países, o sistema posteriormente agregou Canadá, Austrália e Nova Zelândia – formando os Cinco Olhos ou Five Eyes -, unidos pela língua inglesa e pelo objetivo de antecipar os movimentos dos inimigos.

As organizações de cada país que participam do sistema, sob o comando da NSA, são o GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters), do Reino Unido, o CSEC (Communications Security Establishment Canada), do Canadá, o ASD (Australian Signals Directorate), da Austrália, e o GCSB (Government Communications Security Bureau), da Nova Zelândia. Juntos, eles criaram o Echelon, uma rede de vigilância global e de espionagem.

Como em tudo que diz respeito à espionagem, à exceção das revelações de Snowden, baseadas em documentos subtraídos da NSA, há poucos indícios concretos e documentados da atuação dos Five Eyes. Segundo investigação feita pelo Parlamento Europeu em 2001, por exemplo, o Echelon foi usado pelos EUA para colaborar com a empresa americana Raytheon na concorrência lançada pelo governo brasileiro por serviços e equipamentos para o Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia, o Sivam. Os americanos venceram a disputa.

Em março de 2014, a revista Der Spiegel publicou documentos mostrando que, por meio do CGHQ, e sob o comando da NSA, os sistemas de satélite da Alemanha se tornaram alvo de espionagem. Segundo o presidente da Cloud Security Alliance Brasil (CSA Brasil), Paulo Pagliusi, ouvido pela CPI da Espionagem, os Five Eyes monitoram chamadas telefônicas e de fax, transmissões de rádio e os acessos à internet em todo o mundo.

Mercado

Atentados foram evitados; terroristas, localizados e presos; e inúmeros outros objetivos dos Five Eyes, alcançados como resultado de sua associação, afirmam ex-agentes secretos, muitos deles sob anonimato, ouvidos por grandes veículos da mídia mundial. Para eles, as informações dos Estados Unidos são tão valiosas que não há indignação, reação ou argumentos em favor do direito à privacidade que convençam britânicos, canadenses, australianos e neozelandeses a renunciarem à parceria com os EUA.
“Informações são como ouro. Se você não as tem, não há como sobreviver”, disse à agência Associated Press o ex-chefe da agência de espionagem estrangeira da Nova Zelândia Bruce Ferguson. Nesse “mercado”, a informação é a moeda, e a confiança recíproca, a despeito de eventuais desconfianças mútuas, deve ser o contrato.

(Fonte:
https://www12.senado.leg.br/emdiscussao/edicoes/espionagem-cibernetica/mundo-o-mundo-perplexo-diante-do-big-brother/five-eyes-espionagem-moderna-comecou-ha-quase-um-seculo )

A wikipedia traz uma informação interessante sobre o tema: uma página com depoimento de políticos e funcionários do governo canadense falando da preocupação militar dos ” cinco olhos” com a internet; registro de 2007.

Abaixo transcrito: um trecho muito interessante desse registro (a integra aqui https://sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/committee/391/defe/15evb-e)

considerando que parceiros tecnológicos essenciais da Cambridge Analytica, incluindo o whistleblower do caso, Christopher Wylie, são canadenses.

” Senator Day: You indicated, toward the conclusion of your remarks, that you have technological challenges, and that you complemented our partners with respect to some of the technology they have been able to share with you. In general terms, are you able to tell us what we are talking about? Is this a major change from analogue to digital — adjusting to that kind of activity?

Mr. Adams: That, among other things, of course. The volume and type of communications is literally endless. That combination is the challenge for us. Our vision is security through information superiority. We want to master the Internet. That is a challenge that no one institution — be it ours or the National Security Agency, NSA, for that matter — can manage on their own. We try to do that in conjunction with our allies.

At the same time, we have a threat that is very diverse, very distributed around the world — similar to needles in haystacks. We have the combination of the technology and the threat that, together, make it virtually impossible for any one organization to manage it on its own. That is what we mean by working together. If we are to master that Internet, we will have to do it together; and we are focusing on that.

Senator Day: Do you need more equipment that you do not have now, or are we talking about intelligent operators, who can work that equipment?

Mr. Adams: We are talking about both. We have to try to stay ahead, if possible, of the technological evolution; and we have to have the people who are capable of operating that technologically sophisticated equipment. It is a combination of both.

Do we have enough? We have enough now. We are looking at what we will need in the future to sustain that type of operation. We spend much time on that.

Senator Day: You have a mandated role in legislation for information technology, as well as the foreign intelligence.

Mr. Adams: Yes, we do.

Senator Day: Is your role to protect all the government information technology?

Mr. Adams: Correct.

Senator Day: If there was a virus, for example, that was put into the Internet, is that the area in which you get involved? Would you try to trace that down and let the RCMP know where it likely came from and how to handle it?

Mr. Adams: We would focus on a sophisticated threat — in other words, a state-sponsored threat — but not the average hacker. Public Safety Canada has the responsibility for that aspect of critical infrastructure protection.

Senator Day: Is that in Mr. Day’s department?

Mr. Adams: Yes.

Senator Day: Does he have a group of people, separate from you, that are involved in communications intelligence and protection?

Mr. Adams: Correct; but not intelligence as much as protection. They are not out there looking to see who is putting it in there; they react once they have the virus or once there is something wrong.

Senator Day: Who is doing the job now? You have to react quickly on these things. Sometimes we will see an announcement made — be careful, turn your computer off — every once in a while that happens. Or the media covers a story that a worm virus is working its way through. Who looks after handling the public file on that and tries to find a solution to this?

Mr. Adams: Public Safety Canada handles that; but we would act as the technical advisor if they asked us.

Senator Day: Apart from the information technology side of your mandate, you described yourself as a foreign intelligence agency, in effect, for communications.

Mr. Adams: Correct.

Senator Day: We just had an interesting hypothetical discussion with Mr. Judd about “what ifs.” What if we decided to have a foreign intelligence activity, other than that which would come under section 16 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act? If we had a full-blown foreign intelligence activity, directed as we might determine it to be directed, would it make sense that your foreign intelligence agency activity would be combined with whatever else we put in place for operatives throughout the world?

Mr. Adams: Are you talking about a foreign human intelligence activity?

Senator Day: Yes.

Mr. Adams: Combined is unlikely; there are quite different requirements, technological challenges and training regimes. However, it would certainly complement what we do internationally on foreign intelligence. There would be the combination of our foreign intelligence communications and the foreign human intelligence, which would complement it.

Senator Day: Surely, it would make sense. Intelligence is information that is assessed, analyzed and synthesized so that it applies to whatever group or organization is getting all this information and then trying to get something intelligent out of it.

Mr. Adams: It would come together at the centre; but, for example, we do not run agents. It is a fundamentally different business — the human intelligence business — than ours. We deal in electrons; they deal in humans. That is a whole different demand from the point of view of expertise within the establishment itself.

Senator Day: However, the information that is gathered has to be put together with other information that is gathered. It is like two different operatives putting the information together somewhere.

Mr. Adams: Correct, and that would be the responsibility of assessment agencies, of which we have the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat, IAS, within the Privy Council Office and the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, ITAC, within CSIS. That would come together at that level.

Senator Day: What, if any, direction do you get from Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada?

Mr. Adams: Direction, again, is in the form that their minister would be included in the establishment of the priorities. We take those priorities to the extent that there are external affairs priorities there, and they meet the threshold that has been established as to what the most important priorities are. We would then deal with each of those departments, including Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, to determine specifically what it is we would do to assist them in prosecuting their mandate.

Senator Day: Is your activity — the quarter of reports with respect to Afghanistan — Foreign Affairs-based information and intelligence or tactical military information?

Mr. Adams: It is a combination of all three “Ds” — defence, which is obviously for the military; development, which would be for Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA; and diplomatic, which would be external. I should have made the point that all of that work is not necessarily for defence or for support to military operations; it is to support all of the activities within Afghanistan.

Senator Day: I am glad we had a chance to clarify that.

The Chairman: In that hypothetical foreign capability, you probably have a role in terms of assisting with communications.

Mr. Adams: Yes.

The Chairman: How they would communicate back, and how they might be communicated with — this is your area.

Mr. Adams: Again, we would be there for the technical assistance if that is what is required, yes.

The Chairman: Five authorizations in the last 18 months does not sound like much supervision. Would you care to elaborate on that, so we have a better understanding of authorizations?

Mr. Adams: On the supervision or the authorizations?

The Chairman: I said that five authorizations does not sound like much supervision, and so perhaps we do not understand the nature or quality of the authorizations.

Mr. Adams: The authorizations are extensive documents that lay out exactly what we would want to do. They are only good for a year, and then we have to go back and refresh them. I do not like to use the word “renew,” because it is not a question of re-stamping them. We literally have to go back with the justification included again. The minister then, again, looks at all the requirements and puts his limitations and conditions on that. Every six months, we go back to the minister to tell him what we have done using those authorizations. This includes, for example, how many private communications, if any, we have intercepted and what exactly we have done with those private communications. Over and above that, every year, the CSE commissioner reviews in detail each of those ministerial authorizations.

The Chairman: Can you give us the elements of a hypothetical authorization?

Mr. Akman: A request goes up through the two deputy ministers, as Mr. Adams said, to the minister to authorize the interception of either an activity or class of activities.

The Chairman: When you say “activity” or “class of activities,” give us a hypothetical example as you go through the process.

Mr. Akman: We are getting a bit into operations here.

Robert Gordon, Associate Chief (Operations), Communications Security Establishment: It is a type of collection activity that we are talking about. The minister is authorizing a specific operational technique.

Senator Banks: A technique, not a subject?

Mr. Gordon: That is correct. It is a class of activities.

The Chairman: An example would be intercepting a cellphone call. Surely you are not giving away the store to the bad guys if you say that.

Mr. Gordon: Yes, senator, that conceivably is an example of what we might intercept. We might intercept in a broader class than just cellular phone activity.

Mr. Akman: Then we have to satisfy the minister that the interception would be directed at foreign entities outside of Canada. There are a few conditions set out in the legislation, the most important of which are the measures in place to protect the privacy of Canadians if a private communication will be intercepted.

Just to go back a little, when we are directing our activity at a foreign entity, we do not know beforehand the target, to whom the target will be talking. To use your example of cellphones, we do not know whom someone in a foreign country will call beforehand. That is why we cannot get the prior judicial authorization that we were alluding to before. CSE is getting an authorization that if a communication comes to or from Canada, having an expectation of privacy, CSE would be shielded from the Criminal Code.

This was explained when Bill C-36 went through, both to the Senate and the House of Commons. The ministerial authorization is a shield, because when we are directing at a foreign entity, we do not have the information beforehand. That was the prior problem that CSE needed addressed in Bill C-36. With the definition of “private communication,” it was an offence if we intercepted the communications of a foreign target who happened to be calling someone in Canada.

We do not know beforehand whether, in a year, there will be one communication to or from Canada or a number of them. This ministerial authorization was the regime we put in place to shield the CSE from intercepting a private communication.

If the communication comes to Canada and there is no foreign intelligence value, it is destroyed. The condition in the legislation says that only essential foreign intelligence communications would be retained if they relate to international relations, security or defence. Therefore, if there is a communication to or from Canada that has nothing to do with foreign intelligence, it is destroyed. If it is foreign intelligence and essential, it will be used and retained.

The Chairman: Can you provide the committee with a hard copy of a sample authorization?

Mr. Adams: No, we could not.

The Chairman: Why?

Mr. Adams: Normally they are classified, top secret COMINT — communications intelligence.

The Chairman: I mentioned a sample. You do not have to give us an authorization that you gave to the minister, but just a sample.

Mr. Adams: Could we take that under advisement?

The Chairman: Yes, please. We are not asking for an authorization that you actually gave the minister; we are asking for a sample to see what it looks like.

Mr. Adams: We will see what we can do.

The Chairman: There is the question of managing information sharing with our allies. You mentioned the NSA. There are the Five Eyes, members of the international signals intelligence community: Canada, Great Britain, United States, Australia and New Zealand. Is it your job to decide what is shared? Who, within the system, determines what information you collect is shared with our allies with whom we work closely?

Mr. Adams: Essentially, it is driven very much by the priorities. If it is a priority and there is a mutual interest in sharing, we would share consistent with our priorities and consistent with the interests of Canada.

The Chairman: Who makes that judgment? Is that your judgment or a judgment made by someone else in the system?

Mr. Adams: Some judgments are mine, and, with others, I would go up and seek authority if I was in doubt.

Senator Banks: I am confused. Mr. Akman was describing the authorization. It is the nature of the authorization that I am asking about. Mr. Akman often called it “the communication,” but you said earlier that the nature of the authorization that you get is not to obtain a communication between Fred in Indonesia and me.

Mr. Adams: No.

Senator Banks: It is to intercept that sort of communication. Have I got that right? The authorization allows you to use a particular technological device to intercept a certain kind of communication?

Mr. Adams: Correct.

Senator Banks: Having got that authorization, can you use it to apply to anyone?

Mr. Adams: Any number of intercepts, yes.

Senator Banks: Some of those authorizations include the authority to interrupt communications from someone in Indonesia and in circumstances in which that Canadian might otherwise have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Mr. Adams: Correct.

Senator Zimmer: Major General, you are probably too young to remember, but many years ago I worked for the Minister of National Defence, and we did cross paths. I am sort of like the Flight of the Phoenix. I expired in flames, and I have come back here in this form. It is good to see you again.

The relationship that your organization has is part of National Defence. In your opinion, is it positioned in the right place?

Mr. Adams: Yes.

Senator Atkins: Why?

Mr. Adams: Historically, it is correct, in the sense that that has been our home department since post-World War II. However, in practical terms, that is where the vast majority of our efforts are concentrated at this particular time. Where else would be more appropriate? No matter where you argue, there are pros and cons for both, but we are quite comfortable where we are. It seems to be working. Back to the bifurcation, this is part of the reason I do have a responsibility to the Privy Council Office. No matter where I am, I have to be very careful that I do not become that department’s resource, because I have a much broader mandate, as has been talked about, than to any given department.

Obviously, the National Security Adviser watches closely to ensure that I am not pigeonholed into defence. That is a reasonable explanation.

Senator Zimmer: Do you see it staying there in the future, or are there possibilities of moving under a different command or under a different authority?

Mr. Adams: Do you mean under a different regime?

Senator Zimmer: Yes.

Mr. Adams: Whatever the government decides, we will be where they want us to be, but at this particular time, we are comfortable where we are.

Senator Zimmer: Margaret Bloodworth emphasized in her remarks to you in March that Canada is a net importer of intelligence. You mentioned that. Technically, is it net as in gross or net as in fishing for information? What do you mean by the term “net importer”?

Mr. Adams: I mean all of those. In relative terms, we are small, obviously, compared to the National Security Agency of the United States. We are relatively small even in comparison to Government Communications Headquarters, GCHQ, in Great Britain. We would generally gain more than we give. There are some areas where we are more active than they are, and that is the game based on our national priorities. There are some areas in the world where we are present and other people are not. Obviously, in that case, we would be an exporter of information, if that information was needed elsewhere.

In total, that is basically it, senator.

The Chairman: Do protocols exist where you have divided up the spectrum, as it were?

Mr. Adams: No, they do not, senator. It is based purely on our priorities as defined by the government.

The Chairman: Allied countries do not get together and say, “You seem to be doing fairly well in this area, but we have a bit of a gap over here; any chance of you moving into it?”

Mr. Adams: No, we do not. If it is important to Canada, we will be there, if we can get there, obviously.

In discussions, as I said earlier, knowing the priorities that we have, we would share if there are mutual priorities and mutual national interests.” (fonte: https://sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/committee/391/defe/15evb-e).

Dos “cinco olhos”, apenas Austrália e Nova Zelândia não fazem parte da OTAN. Este o cenário internacional e pouco dos bastidores históricos.

E agora falando do Brasil do golpe, chegamos ao ministro Fachin: o que faz um ministro do judiciário pedir a milionária contratação de uma empresa privada de segurança, abrindo mão da Polícia Federal e do trabalho de agentes públicos de segurança e inteligência?
Quais foram as ameaças que motivaram a contratação milionária? O que justificou a dispensa da PF? Qual a relação disso com a chicana judicial do sr. Fachin com o TRF4 contra Lula e contra o estado democrático de direito nacional?
Qual a relação dos ministros do TSE e STF com empresas privadas de comunicação – Facebook e Globélica – e com agências internacionais de inteligência, tipo NSA? Sabem dizer se foram espionados por agentes internacionais? O que a Abin tem a dizer? Quem no Brasil e na América Latina entende desse assunto pra dar informações e separar a intriga real da teoria conspiratória improvável?
A esquerda que pretende governar deve não só fortalecer sua preparação na área de comunicação como desenvolver expertise em segurança tecnológica e contra-espionagem. Será que Cuba pode ajudar?

Sampa/SP, 23/06/2018 – 23:37 (alterado às 23:44).