Propostas alternativas para a crise europeia

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EuroMemorandum 2013: Propostas para uma alternativa para sair da crise econômica européia

O Grupo Memorandum (http://www.euromemo.eu) reúne desde 1995 economistas de diversos países europeus, que analisam criticamente a situação econômica européia, especialmente os danos provocados por uma unificação capitaneada porinteresses financeiros e industriais dos países centrais, e que peca pela falta de participação e transparência. Às tendências dominantes na União Européia esse grupo vem propondo, ano após ano, estratégias alternativas de desenvolvimento econômico, à luz de valores como pleno emprego, justiça social, erradicação da pobreza e exclusão social, sustentabilidade ambiental, e solidariedade internacional. 

Ao público não europeu que comunga esses mesmos valores, o acompanhamento dos trabalhos e análises, de excelente qualidade, desse grupo é imprescindível, e recomendo como leitura obrigatória o estudo do site e dos diversos documentos nele contidos.  

EuroMemorandum 2013: The deepening crisis in the European Union: The need for a fundamental change 

European Economists for an Alternative Economic Policy in Europe – EuroMemo Group 

To the memory of Tadeusz Kowalik (1925-2012), distinguished Polish political economist and indefatigable advocate of the welfare and democratic rights of workers and their families.  

http://www2.euromemorandum.eu/uploads/euromemorandum_2013_summary_english.pdf

Introduction

The crisis which began in 2007 and deepened dramatically in 2008 has exposed deep rifts in the architecture of the European monetary union. Harsh austerity policies which were first imposed on Countries in Eastern Europe, and subsequently on the countries in the euro area periphery, are now beginning to be implemented in countries of the European core. The crisis is highlighting the deeply undemocratic construction of the EU, as the Commission assumes ever greater powers to control national budgets, without any serious oversight by the European Parliament. At the same time, the position of the core countries of the North, and in particular Germany, has been strengthened in relation to the countries of the periphery. But Germany’s economy, which has depended on stagnant wages and a rising export surplus, cannot be a model for the whole EU. In the face of global climate change, the EU’s approach to the Rio+20 conference in July 2012 contributed to its failure to reach any serious agreement.  

1. Economic and Financial Policy 

Economic expansion came to an end in the EU in 2012 with output still below that in 2008. There were recessions throughout the euro area periphery, and output fell during the year by a further 3% in Portugal and 6% in Greece. In Eastern Europe most countries registered some growth in 2012, but output is still down on pre-crisis levels, except in Poland and Slovakia. Countries in the euro area core registered some growth but it was low, and even Germany, which grew strongly in 2010 and 2011, was affected as many of its trading partners in Europe were subjected to austerity programmes. 

In early 2012, 25 member states acted, primarily at German insistence, to introduce the so-called Fiscal Compact, a legal limit restricting each country’s structural budget deficit to 0.5% of GDP, a measure which will effectively prevent countries pursing an active fiscal policy in the future. Meanwhile, as the interaction of the debt crisis and the banking crisis threatened to deepen dangerously, the European Central bank (ECB) launched its Long Term Refinancing Operation. It provided commercial banks with some €1tn of three-year loans at 1% interest between December 2011 and February 2012; despite this, bank lending to households and firms actually declined slightly in the course of 2012. After speculation against Spanish and Italian bonds intensified in mid-2012, the ECB also announced its programme of Outright Monetary Transactions. This promises unlimited central bank intervention to support government bonds in the secondary market – but only if countries first agree to an approved programme of policies with the EU’s rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism. Although the ECB has yet to act, the announcement secured a fragile financial stability in the second half of the year. 

Estimates of the combined impact of the various fiscal rules being introduced in the euro area suggest that between 2013 and 2016 GDP could decline by as much as 3.5% in the euro area as a whole, some 5-8% in Italy, Portugal and Spain and 10% in Greece and Ireland. The European Summit in July 2012 proposed to create a European Banking Union, which will involve a common supervision by the ECB; a common deposit insurance; and a common resolution authority. But with some 6,000 banks there are unresolved issues about which banks the ECB will supervise directly, and some Northern countries have indicated an unwillingness to proceed with the common deposit insurance and resolution authority. 

Fiscal policy should, in place of austerity, focus on reducing unemployment. Public spending should promote socially and environmentally desirable investment projects. A European currency requires a European fiscal policy, with expenditure in the order of 10% so as to cushion downturns and to ensure an effective transfer of resources between richer and poorer regions. Regional and industrial policies should be strengthened and the European Investment Bank, which is empowered to issue euro bonds, should facilitate a major programme of investments, especially in the most crisis stricken countries in Southern and Eastern Europe. In order to eliminate the large current account imbalances, surplus countries should also be required to expand demand. Employment policy should seek to promote skilled, well paid jobs since competition based on low pay will always be undercut elsewhere in the world. The normal working week should be reduced to 30 hours, both in order to combat unemployment and as part of a shift to a society where people’s lives are not dominated by waged work.  

The overexpansion of the financial sector should be radically reversed. Commercial and investment banking should be completely separated, and public  and cooperative commercial banks should be promoted to provide finance for sustainable investment projects. Investment banks, hedge funds and private equity funds should be tightly curtailed. All securities should be traded on approved public platforms, new securities should be subject to strict testing, and a public European ratings agency should be established. All financial transactions should be subject to a transactions tax. The ECB should be brought under effective democratic control, and its main focus should be on ensuring financial stability through the establishment of a comprehensive, anti-cyclical, system-wide European stability framework.

2. Governance in the EU 

A wide range of governance changes have been introduced in the EU in response to the crisis of government debt: new legislation, such as the ‘six-pack’, which tightens the rules of the stability and growth pact; new treaties and intergovernmental agreements, such as the Treaty on Coordination and Governance, involving tighter constraints on member state budgets; and new procedures, such as the ‘European Semester’ which reinforces the annual cycle in which the Commission and Council inspect member state macroeconomic policies and ‘reform programmes.’ The common theme of these changes is to subject the economically weaker countries to a comprehensive system of tutelage with unremitting pressure for expenditure cuts, erosion of labour standards and privatisation of public assets. For those member states which have received ‘bailout’ funds the controls and restraints are even more oppressive, amounting, in the case of Greece, to a virtually colonial system. 

The unavoidable consequence of these developments is to intensify the longstanding legitimacy crisis of the EU. The democratic deficit widens as key decisions are shielded from democratic pressures; as the big corporations dictate EU policies and the content of EU legislation; as the powerful European Central Bank takes critical decisions for which it  is not democratically accountable and as national social models are disorganised and dismantled in the name of the single market or of fiscal consolidation. 

Although detailed proposals could be put forward to change present governance procedures, they will be futile without a complete change in the direction of EU policy with priority for decent employment and social justice. It has to be recognised that the EU’s legitimacy crisis is now so severe that potential challenges to the existing regime at member state level will increasingly be seen as legitimate. 

3. Restructuring the social agenda 

Austerity policies are also blighting the lives of millions of Europeans, most especially in the Southern and Eastern countries of the periphery. In the EU the official unemployment rate in 2012 was 10.6% but in Spain and Greece it was to 25%, and while the youth unemployment rate for the EU was 22.7%, in Spain and Greece it was over 50%. In place of closing tax loopholes, austerity policies have focussed on expenditure cuts, resulting in the postponement or cancellation of infrastructure projects as well as reductions in recurrent expenditure in healthcare, education, social provision and welfare benefits. Public employment has been reduced significantly in many countries and, due to the recession and the impact of austerity policies, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of the population at risk of poverty. The poorest sectors have been hit worst but, in the crisis   stricken countries, many middle-class citizens have also been affected. 

Historically, social policies in Europe have been provided by managing or removing the market in the provision of services, through food subsidies or the free provision of health services and certain levels of education. Now the de-commodification of public services is being reversed through the introduction of vouchers and user fees for health and education services. At the same time, the EU Commission advocates increasing the flexibility of labour markets, but pay freezes, cuts in pensions and increased retirement ages, together with an easing  of restrictions on layoffs and limits on unemployment benefits all represent a further weakening of the provisions of Europe’s vaunted social model. 

The failure of the EU and leading member states to achieve any significant harmonisation of direct taxation has allowed tax competition to flourish, as states offer favourable rates to existing or potential investors, and exposed the vulnerabilities of states with low taxation. All member states should commit themselves to the principal of progressive taxation and an approximate harmonisation of scales. Corporation and other tax rates should be close to avoid profit shifting, and all member states should commit themselves to transparency and a full exchange of information about incomes. Tax avoidance facilities in Europe and the use of tax havens must be eliminated, and there should be a greater taxation of wealth. The shift from direct taxes towards more regressive indirect taxes should be reversed and the destructive dynamic of tax competition must be eliminated. 

4. A development strategy for the European periphery 

The centre-periphery divide pre-dates the European integration process, but the neo-liberal design of the integration process has widened the divide. In the Mediterranean countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal), accession to the EU was followed by a partial de-industrialisation as governments lost the ability to pursue national industrial policies and, upon entry to the euro, also lost their ability to protect domestic industry through devaluations. Exacerbated by wage deflation in Germany and other Northern European countries, current account deficits grew strongly. In the Baltic and South-East European countries, growth was strongly dependent on an expansion of loans, largely in foreign currencies. Inflows of foreign capital fuelled real estate booms, but overvalued exchange rates were detrimental to industrial development, leading to current account deficits even larger than in the Mediterranean countries. In the Visegrad countries (The Czech Reublic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) industrial sectors became closely linked to German export industries and, except in the case of Hungary, their current account deficits were smaller.  

The Baltic and South-East European countries were affected by the crisis in autumn 2008 as a dwindling or even reversal of capital inflows hit the heart of their growth models. Hungary, Latvia and Romania were the first countries to apply for rescue programmes to the International Monetary Fund and the EU; the programmes’ main aim was to stabilise exchange rates, which was the priority of the West European banks that had lent extensively to the countries. The impact of the programmes led to a plummeting of living standards, especially in Latvia. The Mediterranean countries faced the full weight of dwindling capital flows, capital flight and speculative attack in 2010, beginning in Greece. The reaction of the core euro area governments was very slow, and strict austerity programmes focussed on cutting the government deficits, but also aimed at reducing current account deficits. These programmes have bought time for West European banks to disengage from the Mediterranean countries, but austerity policies have not addressed the problem of deindustrialisation and these countries are in a developmental cul-de-sac. The East European countries were primarily affected by a severe contraction of exports in late 2008 and early 2009, and their subsequent recovery was linked to the recovery of German exports – prospects for which dimmed in 2012 due to the impact of austerity policies in Europe and the growth slowdown in key markets such as China.   

EU regional policies have focussed on infrastructural development, and not on building viable productive structures. The new EU budget for 2014-2020, due to be agreed in early 2013, is proposing to reduce spending on cohesion policies by some 5% from the current level, and to redistribute its allocation to the benefit of richer and middling (‘transition’) countries at the expense of poorer countries. The so-called ‘Friends of Better Spending’ in Northern Europe are also calling for macroeconomic conditions to be attached to cohesion spending, and this appears likely to be agreed. EU peripheral countries have succeeded in reducing their current account deficits, but this has been the result of suppressing domestic demand through strict austerity programmes, and has had disastrous social consequences. EU leaders claim that the structural reforms required by EU/IMF programmes – privatisation and the deregulation of labour markets – will enhance competitiveness, but pro-active industrial policies are completely absent from the programmes. EU policies also fail to address the current account surpluses generated by Germany and other Northern countries as a result of pursuing neo-mercantilist policies.  

The current level of public debt in Greece and other peripheral countries is clearly unsustainable. Such debt should be subject to a debt audit to determine which parts are legitimate, and remaining debt should be written down to a sustainable level. The ECB’s role as lender of last resort in the government bond market should be extended, and decoupled from demands for strict austerity policies. The EU budget should be raised from the current 1% of EU GDP towards 10%, in order to facilitate macroeconomic stabilisation, and in order to facilitate a major investment and development programme in the southern and eastern periphery of the EU. Active industrial and regional policies are required to promote the process of development in the peripheral countries, since development does not occur only as a result of market processes. Current EU regional and cohesion policy has mainly promoted metropolitan areas, but support for poorer areas is important to increase employment and output. Regional policy has focussed on the regional and urban level, but this is to the detriment of the national level, which is often more appropriate for promoting development. The full use of resources requires democratic participation and not elite planning. In particular, the ‘Smart Specialisation’ proposed by the EU whereby every region should be a world leader in some area cannot work as there are not sufficient products to go round and over-specialisation is likely. Furthermore while intra-regional trade is important, there should be greater attention to promoting more ecologically sustainable forms of production by using local resources for local consumption, for example in the case of food or energy generation. Economic policy in the EU must be rebalanced, and whereas the newly instituted procedure in the EU applies to countries with external deficits, countries with external surpluses should also be required to adopt more expansionary policies so as to increase their imports.      

5. The Crisis in Global Governance 

Two overwhelming failures characterise the field of global governance in 2012. Firstly, no substantial progress has   made on financial reform or economic coordination. The unresolved euro area crisis represents a growing threat to the global economy which is slowing down. Despite numerous declarations about the need to address global challenges, the root causes of the global financial crisis – massive current account imbalances, inequality of income and wealth and unregulated and volatile financial markets – still remain unsolved. Current account imbalances remain well above sustainable levels. The implementation of new financial regulation has lagged far behind declarations of intent. The too-big-to-fail problem is far from being resolved and financial institutions are becoming even larger and more concentrated; risky activities are still being transferred, perhaps on an increasing scale, to the non-regulated shadow banking system. 

Secondly, the environmental dimension of global governance combines situations of extreme and growing urgency – e.g. climate change and biodiversity destruction – with a decreasing political capacity to act. The Rio+20 summit in 2012 proved incapable of renewing the global agenda of sustainability politics. Environmental governance has been pushed to the side-lines, reduced to lip-service in the main fields of economic development, and to fragmented and inadequate measures in the field of nature protection.

Currently, there is no global institution or set of institutions effectively overseeing and controlling global and systemic risks, such as global current account imbalances, asset bubbles, excessive exchange rates fluctuations, large swings in capital flows, levels of international reserves or harmful tax competition and tax evasion. Institutions that are currently supposed to assume (part of) these tasks – the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of 20 (G20), the Financial Stability Forum, the Bank of International Settlements, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – are currently not effective in carrying them out in practice. In the field of global environmental governance, the EU’s official policy seems to have retreated since the onset of the financial and economic crisis and, in so far as it exists, it is woefully deficient. 

Reform of global financial governance must be based on the imperatives of equity and of economic and financial stability and must be organised in a representative and transparent manner. Instead of the G20, a self-appointed group of countries, objective and explicit selection criteria should be employed to establish a ‘Global Economic Council’, as proposed by the UN Commission chaired by Joseph Stiglitz. The IMF needs to be subjected to substantial reforms in its governance, mandate and policy recommendations. If there is the political will more transparency in tax issues is quite achievable. As the UN is currently the most representative coordination forum, the EU and other OECD members should transfer resources and the mandate from the OECD to a high-level UN tax institution and provide it with sufficient expertise and power to effectively combat tax evasion and tax avoidance, and to reduce tax competition. 

Any meaningful alternative political strategy in the field of global environmental governance must reject the privatisation of water, energy and, generally speaking, of the Commons, must contest the monetisation of nature, and refuse the weakening or replacement of binding regulation by mere market mechanisms. The EU could promote its own capacity to develop long-term sustainability by engaging in a new type of multilateralism. Instead of trying to always claim the leading role for itself – or for its leading member countries – and instead of addressing all the others as subordinates that need to be led, the EU and its member states should practise a kind of open diplomacy, in which those who are most advanced in a specific field take the lead.

List of signatories (as of January 2013)

1. Ackermann, Tim, Bochum, Germany 

2.  Acocella, Nicola, Rome, Italy 

3.  Alexiou, Constantinos, Thessaloniki, Greece 

4.  Altvater, Elmar, Berlin, Germany

5.  Altzinger, Wilfried, Vienna, Austria 

6.  Álvarez, Peralta, Nacho, Madrid, Spain 

7.  Andersson, Jan, Otto, Turku, Finland 

8.  André, Christine, Paris, France 

9.  Antunes, Margarida, Coimbra, Portugal 

10.  Appelqvist, Örjan, Stockholm, Sweden 

11.  Araújo, Sandra, Porto, Portugal

12.  Arenz, Horst, Berlin, Germany

13.  Argitis, Giorgos, Athens, Greece 

14.  Atzmueller, Roland, Linz, Austria 

15.  Baier, Walter, Vienna, Austria 

16.  Baldocchi, Umberto, , Lucca, Italy 

17.  Bartel, Rainer, Linz, Austria 

18.  Baum, Josef, Vienna, Austria

19.  Becker, Johannes, Marburg, Germany 

20.  Becker, Joachim, Vienna, Austria 

21.  Bellofiore, Riccardo, Bergamo, Italy 

22.  Benyik, Matyas, Budapest, Hungary 

23.  Biagioli, Mario, Parma, Italy 

24.  Bieling, Hans-Jürgen, Tübingen, Germany 

25.  Birg, Thomas, Hattingen, Germany 

26.  Bischoff, Joachim, Hamburg, Germany, 

27.  Bispinck, Reinhard, Düsseldorf, Germany 

28.  Blaas, Wolfgang, Vienna, Austria 

29.  Blankenburg, Stephanie, London, UK, 

30.  Bohle, Dorothee, Budapest, Hungary 

31.  Boixadera, i, Bosch, Ramon, Siena, Italy 

32.  Bömer, Hermann, Dortmund, Germany 

33.  Bontrup, Heinz-J.  Recklinghausen, Germany 

34.  Braña, Pino, Francisco-Javier, Salamanca, Spain 

35.  Brandner-Weiss, Renate, Horn, Austria 

36.  Brandt, Peter, Hagen, Germany 

37.  Breathnach, Proinnsias, Maynooth, Co, Kildare, Ireland 

38.  Brockmann, Olaf, Berlin, Germany

39.  Buchegger, Reiner, Linz, Austria

40.  Buenos, Ayres, Carlos Antonio Mendes de Carvalho, Teresina, Brazil

41.  Burkert, Sylvia, Düsseldorf, Germany

42.  Burley, John, Divonne-les-Bains, France

43.  Buzaglo, Jorge, Stockholm, Sweden

44.  Cafruny, Alan, Clinton,, NY, USA

45.  Calame, Claude, Paris, France

46.  Campo, Guardiola, José, Spain 

47.  Canale, Rosaria Rita, Naples, Italy 

48.  Castells, Angels Martinez, Castelldefels, Spain 

49.  Cesen, Tanja, Lesce, Slovenia

50.  Christen, Christian, Berlin, Germany

51.  Clarke, Linda, London, UK

52.  Colom, Agusti, Barcelona, Spain 

53.  Correa, Eugenia, Mexico, City, Mexico 

54.  Corsi, Marcella, Rome, Italy

55.  Costabile, Lilia, Napoli, Italy 

56.  Coutrot, Thomas, Montreuil, France 

57.  Cvejic, Slobodan, Belgrade, Serbia

58.  Czeskleba-Dupont, Rolf, Roskilde, Denmark 

59.  Dahlqvist, Bo, Waterloo, Belgium

60.  Danielowski, Adelheid, Trebel, Germany 

61.  de Arriba, Raúl, Valencia, Spain 

62.  de la Cámara, Carmen, Barcelona, Spain 

63.  de Masi, Fabio, Berlin, Germany

64.  De Silva, Mervyn , Colombo, Sri Lanka 

65.  Debruyne, Michel, Brussels, Belgium

66.  Dellheim, Judith, Berlin, Germany

67.  Demathas, Zacharias, Athens, Greece 

68.  Deppe, Frank, Marburg, Germany

69.  Deppe-Wortmann, Friedel, Bochum, Germany 

70.  Derksen, Herbert, Kleve, Germany

71.  Detje, Richard, Ahrensburg, Germany 

72.  Devrim, Mecit, Nurkalp, Brussels, Belgium 

73.  Dohm, Gloria, Saarbrücken, Germany

74.  Dolata, Ulrich, Stuttgart, Germany

75.  Dourakis, George, Thessaloniki, Greece 

76.  Dragasakis, Yannis, Athens, Greece

77.  Drigo, Elio, Udine, Italy

78.  Duffy, Katherine, Leicester, UK 

79.  Dufresne, Anne, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium 

80.  Dymarski, Wlodzimierz, Poznan, Poland

81.  Dymski, Gary, Leeds, UK, 82.  Edwards, Michael, London, UK 

83.  Efthimios, Liakos, Kozani, Greece

84.  Egener, Jürgen, Willich, Germany 

85.  Elsner, Wolfram, Bremen, Germany 

86.  Erne, Roland, Dublin, Ireland

87.  Ernst, Joachim, Bremen, Germany 

88.  Esposito, Giovanni, Brussels, Belgium 

89.  Etxezarreta, Miren, Barcelona, Spain 

90.  Evans, Trevor, Berlin, Germany

91.  Falk, Rainer, Luxembourg, Luxembourg 

92.  Falkenstein, Jürgen, Göppingen, Germany 

93.  Farah, Frederic, Paris, France

94.  Farkas, Péter, Budapest, Hungary 

95.  Farrell, Fintan, Brussels, Belgium 

96.  Fernandez do Vale Hort, Maria Aurora, Duisburg, Germany 

97.  Fiala, Franz, Vienna, Austria

98.  Fiehler, Fritz, Husum, Germany 

99.  Finke, Meinolf, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany 

100.  Flacher, David, Villetaneuse, France

101.  Fonseca, Jorge, Madrid, Spain

102.  Fontserè, Pilar, Roda de Ter, Spain 

103.  Frangakis, Marica, Athens, Greece 

104.  Fubini, Lia, Torino, Italy

105.  Garcia, Rosa, Barcelona, Spain 

106.  Garcia-Arias, Jorge, Leon, Spain 

107.  Gauthier, Elisabeth, Corbeil-Essonnes, France 

108.  Gayk, Elmar, Trebel, Germany

109.  Gensicke, Holger, Landesbergen, Germany 

110.  Georgantas, Elias, Athens, Greece

111.  Giannone, Carlo, Benevento, Italy 

112.  Gindis, David, Hatfield/Herts, UK

113.  Ginsburg, Helen, New, York/NY, USA 

114.  Glawe, Heiko, Berlin, Germany

115.  Gnesutta, Claudio, Rome, Italy 

116.  Goda, Hiroshi, Tokyo, Japan

117.  Gogoll, Joachim, F.  Gelsenkirchen, Germany 

118.  Goldberg, Gertrude, Garden, City, NY, USA 

119.  Göll, Edgar, Berlin, Germany

120.  Gough, Ian, London, UK

121.  Grahl, John, London, UK 

122.  Gryschko, Rainer, Mainz, Germany

123.  Guptara, , Prabhu, , Shillong, India 

124.  Hagenah, Jens-Uwe, Bad, Schwartau, Germany 

125.  Halicioglu, Ferda, Istanbul, Turkey

126.  Hammer, Andreas, Östringen, Germany 

127.  Hanan, Robin, Dublin, Ireland

128.  Händel, Thomas, Fürth, Germany 

129.  Harcourt, Geoff, C.  Sydney, Australia 

130.  Harde, Christian, Tübingen, Germany 

131.  Hauff, Rüdiger, Stuttgart, Germany

132.  Heike, Anny, Fürth, Germany

133.  Hein, Eckhard, Berlin, Germany 

134.  Heinemann, Volker, Vellmar, Germany 

135.  Helmedag, Fritz, Chemnitz, Germany

136.  Henn, Gottfried, Landau, Germany

137.  Henscheid, Renate, Essen, Germany 

138.  Hermann, Christoph, Berlin, Germany 

139.  Hermann, Imre, Budapest, Hungary

140.  Herr, Hansjörg, Berlin, Germany

141.  Herrmann, Peter, Kuopio, Finland 

142.  Hesse, Horst, Leipzig, Germany

143.  Hesse, Karl, L.  Bendorf, Germany 

144.  Holland, Stuart, Coimbra, Portugal 

145.  Hoós, János, Budapest, Hungary

146.  Horn, Laura, Roskilde, Denmark

147.  Hudson, Paul, London, UK

148.  Husar, Jaroslav, Bratislava, Slovakia 

149.  Husson, Michel, Noisy-le-Grand Cedex, France

150.  Hyman, Richard, London, UK

151.  Igel, Jayne-Ann, Dresden, Germany 

152.  Ioannidis, Yiorgos, Athens, Greece

153.  Ioannou, Stefanos, Athens, Greece 

154.  Irvin, George, London, UK

155.  Jäger, Johannes, Vienna, Austria 

156.  Janssen, Joern, London, UK

157.  Janssen, Siebo M.H.,  Bonn, Germany 

158.  Jeliazkova, Maria, Sofia, Bulgaria

159.  Jolly, Richard, Lewes, UK

160.  Jones, Peter, Bath, UK

161.  Kaltenbrunner, Annina, Leeds, UK 

162.  Kapeller, Jakob, Linz, Austria

163.  Karamessini, Maria, Athens, Greece 

164.  Karanikolas, Pavlos, Athens, Greece 

165.  Karasavvoglou, Anastasios G.,  Kavala, Greece 

166.  Karrass, Anne, Berlin, Germany

167.  Käss, Helmut, Braunschweig, Germany

168.  Kaufmann, Marieta, Vienna, Austria 

169.  Kisker, Klaus, Peter, Berlin, Germany 

170.  Klatzer, Elisabeth, Vienna, Austria

171.  Klute, Jürgen, Herne, Germany

172.  Koch, Hans-Gerhard, Fürth, Germany 

173.  Koch, Max, Lund, Sweden

174.  Köhler, Gabriele, Munich, Germany 

175.  Konstantinidis, Charalampos, Boston, USA 

176.  Koratzanis, Athanasios, Athens, Greece

177.  Kreimer de Fries, Joachim, Berlin, Germany 

178.  Kreutz, Daniel, Köln, Germany

179.  Krüger, Heinrich, Berlin, Germany 

180.  Krumme, Bernd, Kassel, Germay

181.  Kühlböck, Karin, Vienna, Austria 

182.  Kulke, Roland, Brussels, Belgium

183.  Kurtzke, Wilfried, Frankfurt, Germany 

184.  Lang, Dany, Villetaneuse, France

185.  Laukkanen, Erkki, Helsinki, Finland 

186.  Leaman, Jeremy, Loughborough, UK 

187.  Lebaron, Frederic, Amiens, France

188.  Lehndorff, Steffen, Duisburg, Germany 

189.  Liagouras, George, Chios, Greece

190.  Lieber, Christoph, Hamburg, Germany 

191.  Liebl, Georg, Leidersbach, Germany 

192.  Lindemann, Beate, Germany

193.  Lindemann, Hedi, Germany

194.  Lindner, Stephan, Berlin, Germany 

195.  Loer, Barbara, Bremen, Germany

196.  Lopez, Luís, , Coimbra, Portugal

197.  López-Pina, Antonio, Madrid, Spain 

198.  Lorant, Karoly, Budapest, Hungary

199.  Louçã, Francisco, , Lisbon, Portugal 

200.  Lövgren, Sophia, Stockholm, Sweden 

201.  Lucarelli, Bill, Penrith, South DC/NSW, Australia 

202.  Lucchese, Matteo, Urbino, Italy 

203.  Maeße, Jens, Mainz, Germany

204.  Mahnkopf, Birgit, Berlin, Germany 

205.  Margner, Manfred, Oldenburg, Germany 

206.  Marguery, , Olivier, Paris, France

207.  Marquardt, Jochen, Hagen, Germany 

208.  Marques Pereira, Jaime, Amiens, France 

209.  Martinez Sanchez, Jose Maria, Burgos, Spain 

210.  Mattfeldt, Harald, Hamburg, Germany 

211.  Mazier, Jacques, Villetaneuse, France

212.  Mencinger, Jože, Ljubljana, Slovenia

213.  Messkoub, Mahmood, De, Hague, Netherlands 

214.  Meštrovic, Matko, , Zagreb, Croatia

215.  Michie, Jonathan, Oxford, UK

216.  Milios, John, (Ioannis), Athens, Greece 

217.  Milonakis, Dimitris, Halandri, Greece

218.  Morva, Tamás, Budapest, Hungary

219.  Moses, Jonathon, W.  Trondheim, Norway 

220.  Mueller-Maige, Siegfried, Frankfurt, Germany 

221.  Müller, Bernhard, Hamburg, Germany

222.  Nickel, Dieter, Bremen, Germany

223.  Nielsen, Klaus, London, Germany

224.  Nielsen, Peter M.,  Roskilde, Denmark 

225.  Novy, Andreas, Vienna, Austria 

226.  O’Brien, Ronan, Brussels, Belgium 

227.  Oehlke, Paul, Cologne, Germany

228.  Onaran, Ozlem, London, UK

229.  Ortiz, Isabel, Barcelona, Spain 

230.  Palacio-Vera, Alfonso, Madrid, Spain 

231.  Palmer, John, London, UK

232.  Papadaki, Daphne, Athens, Greece 

233.  Pashkoff, Susan, I.  London, UK

234.  Paterson, Keith, Aberdeen, UK 

235.  Patomäki, Heikki, Helsinki, Finland 

236.  Perraton, Jonathan, R.  Sheffield, UK 

237.  Petit, Pascal, Paris, France

238.  Petkov, Krastyo, Sofia, Bulgaria 

239.  Pfister, Helmut, Erlangen, Germany 

240.  Piacentini, Paolo, M.  , Rome, Italy 

241.  Pianta, Mario, Urbino, Italy

242.  Pinheiro, Frederico, Lisbon, Portugal 

243.  Pini, Paolo, Ferrara, Italy

244.  Pippert, Matthias, Lauterbach, Germany 

245.  Plaschke, Henrik, Aalborg, Denmark

246.  Plihon, Dominique, Paris, France

247.  Podkaminer, Leon, Vienna, Austria 

248.  Podrecca, Elena, Trieste, Italy

249.  Poss, Dennis, Schmelz, Germany 

250.  Ptak, Ralf, Cologne, Germany

251.  Puig, Albert, Barcelona, Spain 

252.  Quaißer, Gunter, Frankfurt, Germany 

253.  Quindós, Fernández, Pablo, Valladolid, Spain 

254.  Quinta, Ansem, Doorn, Belgium

255.  Ramaux, Christophe, Paris, France 

256.  Ramazzotti, Paolo, Macerata, Italy 

257.  Raza, Werner, Vienna, Austria

258.  Reati, Angelo, Brussels, , Belgium 

259.  Rehm, Miriam, Vienna, Austria

260.  Reiner, Friedemann, Cuxhaven, Germany 

261.  Reiner, Sabine, Berlin, Germany

262.  Reiners, Suleika, Hamburg, Germany 

263.  Reischl, Christian, Munich, Germany 

264.  Reitzig, Jörg, Ludwigshafen, Germany 

265.  Ribera, Fumaz, Ramon, Barcelona, Spain 

266.  Ricceri, Marco, Rome, Italy

267.  Rinneberg, Christoph, Wembach, Germany 

268.  Romão, João, Amsterdam, Netherlands

269.  Rompeltien, Bärbel, Sudwalde, Germany 

270.  Ross, Richard, London, UK 

271.  Roßbach, Uwe, Erfurt, Germany 

272.  Rossi, Sergio, Fribourg, Switzerland

273.  Röwekamp, Franz-Josef, Münster, Germany 

274.  Runje, Jacqueline, Dortmund, Germany

275.  Sandoval, Véronique, Paris, France

276.  Sauer, Christoph, Berlin, Germany 

277.  Sauerwein, Ruth, Hagen, Germany 

278.  Savevska, Maja, Warwick, UK

279.  Sawyer, Malcolm, Leeds, UK

280.  Schäffer, Manfred, Bad, Oeynhausen, Germany 

281.  Schatz, Martin, Linz, Austria

282.  Scheutz, Rudolf, Anthering, Austria 

283.  Schieder, Werner, Berlin, Germany 

284.  Schlager, Christa, Austria

285.  Schmidt, Christian, Freiburg, Germany

286.  Schmidt, Gabriele, Gladbeck, Germany 

287.  Schmidt, Ingo, New Westminster/BC, Canada 

288.  Schmitthenner, Horst, Frankfurt, Germany

289.  Scholz, Stefanie, Marie, Berlin, Germany

290.  Schrooten, Mechthild, Bremen, Germany 

291.  Schui, Herbert, Buchholz, Germany

292.  Schulten, Thorsten, Düsseldorf, Germany 

293.  Schunter-Kleemann, Susanne, Bremen, Germany 

294.  Scott, Regan, Woodbridge, UK

295.  Seeck, Dietmar, Emden, Germany 

296.  Setterfield, Mark, Hartford,, CT, USA 

297.  Shamshiev, Chingiz, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic 

298.  Siddiqui, Kalim, Huddersfield, UK

299.  Siebecke, Gerd, Hamburg, Germany 

300.  Sifakis, Catherine, Grenoble, France

301.  Sikka, Prem, Essex, UK

302.  Silva, Manuela, Lisbon, Portugal 

303.  Simoes, Noémia, Certo, Lisbon, Portugal 

304.  Smith, John, Grieve, Cambridge, UK

305.  Solari, Stefano, Padova, Italy

306.  Sorg, Thomas, Gärtringen, Germany 

307.  Sorg, Richard, Hamburg, Germany

308.  Stajic, Igor, Leskovac, Serbia

309.  Staritz, Cornelia, Vienna, Austria 

310.  Steinitz, Klaus, Berlin, Germany

311.  Steinko, Armando, Fernández, Madrid, Spain 

312.  Sterdyniak, Henri, Paris, France

313.  Stigendal, Mikael, Malmö, Sweden 

314.  Stockhammer, Engelbert, Kingston/Thames, UK 

315.  Susías, Carlos, , Madrid, Spain

316.  Swyngedouw, Erik, Manchester, UK 

317.  Széll, György, Osnabrück, Germany

318.  Tanweer, Ali, Prague, Czech Republic 

319.  Tasiran, Ali, C.  London, UK

320.  Telesca, Vito, Potenza, Italy 

321.  Theocarakis, Nicholas J.  Athens, Greece 

322.  Thiermeyer, Hubert, Munich, Germany

323.  Thomasberger, Claus, Berlin, Germany 

324.  Tomidajewicz, Janusz, Poznán, Poland 

325.  Toporowski, Jan, London, UK

326.  Troost, Axel, Leipzig, Germany 

327.  Trouvé, Aurélie, Dijon, France 

328.  Truger, Achim, Düsseldorf, Germany 

329.  Urban, Hans-Jürgen, Frankfurt, Germany 

330.  Uxo, Jorge,  Spain 

331.  van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan, Amsterdam, Netherlands 

332.  van der Pijl, Kees, Brighton, UK

333.  van Egmond, Annelies, Leerbroek, Netherlands 

334.  van Keirsbilck, Felipe, Nivelles, Belgium 

335.  van Maasakker, Henry, Nijmegen, Netherlands 

336.  Vence, Xavier, Santiago de Compostela, Spain 

337.  Veneziani, Roberto, London, UK

338.  Vergés, Joaquim, Cerdanyola, Spain 

339.  Vertova, Giovanna, Bergamo, Italy

340.  Vinokur, Annie, Nanterre, France

341.  Wahsner, Roderich, Bremen, Germany 

342.  Walther, Rolf, Dessau-Roßlau, Germany 

343.  Warda, Hans-Dieter, Bochum, Germany 

344.  Warda, Veronika, Bochum, Germany

345.  Waschkeit, Hugo, Hannover, Germany 

346.  Weekes, Tony, Belfast, Northern Ireland 

347.  Weggenmann, Ralf, Neu-Isenburg, Germany 

348.  Wehlau, Diana, Bremen, Germany

349.  Weihmayr, Benedikt, Hamburg, Germany 

350.  Weinstein, Olivier, Villetaneuse, France

351.  Weissenbacher, Rudy, Vienna, Austria

352.  Wells, Julian, Kingston/Thames, UK

353.  Wendl, Michael, Munich, Germany 

354.  Werner, Alban, Aachen, Germany

355.  Westerheim, Dag, Oslo, Norway

356.  Wirth, Darijusch, Nienburg, Germany 

357.  Wohlmeyer, Heinrich, Vienna, Austria 

358.  Wolf, Frieder, Otto, Berlin, Germany

359.  Wupperman, Beatrix, Bremen, Germany 

360.  Zabkowicz, Jerzy, Warsaw, Poland

361.  Zabkowicz, Anna, Warsaw, Poland